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Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major theoretical attention over 
the past two decades. Two early path-breaking sets of experimental studies were widely 
interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the laboratory.    
We identify the major determinants that seem to affect the incidence, and/or emergence, of 
coordination failure in the lab and review critically the existing experimental studies on 
coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria since that early evidence emerged. We 
conclude that coordination failure is likely to be the exception rather than the rule, both in the lab 





“Several basic conclusions have emerged from this research: 
Coordination failure is common …” (Camerer, 2003, p. 403) 
Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, or “payoff-asymmetric” coordination 
games (Camerer, 2003, section 7.4), have attracted major theoretical attention over the 
past two decades (e.g., Bryant, 1983; Cooper and John, 1988; Carlsson and Van Damme, 
1993; Cooper, 1999; Frankel, Morris and Pauzner, 2003). Two path-breaking and 
frequently cited early sets of experimental studies (namely, Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil 
[from here on VHBB], 1990, 1991, and Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross [from here 
on CDFR], 1990, 1992) have been interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure2 is a 
common phenomenon in the laboratory.   
This claim prompted a steady flow of robustness tests. In this article we review critically 
this class of coordination games, distinguishing between order-statistic games like VHBB 
(1990) and VHBB (1991) and stag-hunt games like the ones in CDFR (1992) that have 
motivated the global games literature (e.g., Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and 
Shin, 2003; Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels, 2004). We are well aware that these labels 
are somewhat misleading, as both are coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, 
and stag-hunt games can also be discussed as a special kind of order-statistic games. 
Mainly for historic reasons – namely, the two sets of experimental studies that initiated 
the experimental literature on coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, and the 
                                                 
2
 Coordination failure can have two meanings: Failure to coordinate on any one of the 
multiple equilibria (sometimes called “disequilibrium outcome”), or failure to coordinate 
on the payoff dominant equilibrium. The latter meaning has been used by VHBB (1990, 
1991) who pointed out that this meaning was the convention that was developing then in 
the literature on macroeconomic coordination games.   
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rather different experimental paradigms used to implement them – do we stick to these 
labels.  
Our research strategy consists in a qualitative review
3
 of the available evidence that is 
informed by an attempt to classify the major classes of structural, cognitive, and 
behavioral determinants that seem to affect coordination failure in the lab
4
. Because of its 
self-evident importance for coordination games outside of the laboratory, we also 
consider briefly the issue of the external validity of the currently available set of 
laboratory coordination game studies.  
 
The remainder of the manuscript is organized as follows. In section 2 we review order- 
statistic games and stag-hunt games by way of some classic examples. In section 3 we  
review critically laboratory evidence of coordination failures and successes, paying 
particular attention to the reasons for particular outcomes. In section 4 we summarize 
what the evidence has taught us about how to engineer coordination successes. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. THE CLASSES OF GAMES UNDER CONSIDERATION 
 
Order-statistic games. The payoff function of a generic order-statistic game can be 
represented as follows: 
  
(1) Πi = f(OS - |ei – OS|) 
 
where OS stands for the order statistic chosen (which could be the median or the 
minimum – the weak link --, or something else), ei denotes the effort choice, |ei – OS| 
denotes the (symmetric) deviation cost, and f is some scalar function of these terms. 
Obviously, the terms can be arbitrarily modified by setting the coefficients of the two 
terms on the RHS not equal to 1, or by squaring the second term, or by defining the 
deviation costs asymmetrically, etc. 
 




Earnings table for the “Median game” (Table Γ in VHBB, 1991) 
                                                 
3A meta-study (e.g., Croson and Marks, 2000, or Zelmer, 2003, for public good 
experiments) that quantitatively evaluates the impact of various factors on coordination 
(failure) is not (yet) possible since design and implementation details have not reached 
the volume that would make such an endeavor possible. A major part of the problem is 
that few authors in the literature under consideration have followed the advice of Davis 
and Holt (1993, p. 520) not to change too many things at once.  
4
 Space constraints forced significant selection on us. We decided, for example, to focus 
on published and forthcoming studies. The present article is a heavily distilled version of 
Devetag and Ortmann (2006). 
5
The results of these studies are among the most celebrated in the literature on 
coordination failure (e.g., Ochs, 1995; Camerer, 2003; or scholar.google).  
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     Median value of X chosen 
    7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Your choice of X 7 1.30 1.15 0.90 0.55 0.10 -0.45 -1.10 
   6 1.25 1.20 1.05 0.8 0.45 0.00 -0.55 
   5 1.10 1.15 1.10 0.95 0.70 0.35 -0.10 
   4 0.85 1.00 1.05 1.00 0.85 0.60 0.25 
   3 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.50 
   2 0.05 0.40 0.65 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.65 
   1 -0.5 -0.05 0.3 0.55 0.70 0.75 0.70 
 
Earnings table for the “Minimum game” (Table A in VHBB, 1990)  
 
     Smallest value of X chosen 
    7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Your choice of X 7 1.30 1.10 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.10 
   6 - 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 
   5 - - 1.10 0.90 0.70 0.50 0.30 
   4 - - - 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 
   3 - - - - 0.90 0.70 0.50 
   2 - - - - - 0.80 0.60 
   1 - - - - - - 0.70 
 
Note that the payoff-dominant, or efficient equilibrium is in the upper left corner for both 
the Minimum game and the Median game while the secure action induces an equilibrium
 
(the secure equilibrium from here on) in the lower right corner for the Minimum game 
and two rows up from the bottom in the Median game. Both games feature seven 
(identical) Pareto-ranked pure-strategy equilibria on the main diagonal. There is a tension 
between the secure action – the lowest action in the Minimum game, and the third lowest 
in the Median game - and the action required for the efficient equilibrium.   
 
Importantly, the payoffs in the triangular area above the main-diagonal are not the same: 
For the Minimum game deviation costs are linear, whereas for the Median game they are 
highly non-linear, leading to negative payoffs in the upper right corner and lower left 
corner. This nonlinearity (and the negative payoffs that it induces) counteracts, and 
possibly neutralizes, the higher robustness of the order statistic. The different types and 
strengths of the deviation costs confound the comparison of effects of the order statistic 
and the results of Median game and Minimum game experiments.
6
 In fact, the labeling of 
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 This confound marrs the intriguing study by Crawford and Broseta (1998) and also 
illustrates the difficulties anyone faces who will attempt a meta-study.  
7
 This confound was to some extent addressed in several later studies (e.g., Cachon and 
Camerer, 1996; Van Huyck, Battalio, and Rankin, 2001; Goeree and Holt, 2005). 
 5 
Stag-hunt games. This class of games, like order-statistic games, feature (typically two) 
pure-strategy equilibria that are Pareto-ranked. Payoffs result from the strategic 
interaction of two players with two action choices each. CDFR (1992) contained the 
paradigmatic example of this class of games, sg(1,x,y,z) = 1,000g(1,0,.8.,.8),  where g is 
normalized to 1, s is a scalar function here taking on the value 1000, x<z, y<1, and x,y,z ε 
[0,1)8: 
 
  Other player’s choice   
  2 1    
Your  2 1,000     0    
Choice 1    800 800 
 
Like the order-statistic games discussed earlier, the payoff-dominant equilibrium is in the 
upper left corner while the secure equilibrium is in the lower right corner: There is thus a 
tension between the risky action (required for the efficient equilibrium) and the secure 
action. It is an unattractive feature of the concept of security that it will always select 
Choice 1 and therefore, quite possibly, select secure but unattractive equilibria. A more 
persuasive solution concept is risk dominance.
9
 For certain values of y and z, efficient 
and risk-dominant equilibrium might coincide (in the upper left corner). Essentially, this 
is the case when the secure action choice is not attractive enough.   
 
Classes of determinants of coordination outcomes. Prominent objective, or structural 
determinants of coordination failure are the specific forms the payoff matrix takes 
(namely such characteristics as the attractiveness of the secure, or maximin, strategy and 
the riskiness of the other action choices), which are partially defined by the type and 
strength of deviation costs (i.e., the penalty incurred by a player who does not best 
respond to other players’ choices), as well as the coordination requirements determined 
by the order statistic
10
, the group size, and the opportunities for shared experience, 
interaction, and informational feedback. These objective factors may be usefully labeled 
exogenous risk characteristics because they are fully under the control of the 
experimenter. 
 
Cognitive and behavioral determinants are those not fully under the control of the 
experimenter. By cognitive determinants we mean issues such as how subjects 
understand the payoff matrices that they are given, or the effects that potentially negative 
payoffs might have on subjects. In light of the well-documented sensitivity of outcomes 
to initial conditions, to be discussed below, in some games (e.g., the “Median” games in 
VHBB, 1991) but not others (e.g., the “Minimum” games in VHBB, 1990), these 
                                                 
8
 The reader is invited to verify that equation (1) leads to a payoff matrix that fulfills the 
conditions on x, y, and z. 
9
 A risk-dominant equilibrium has a greater Nash product of deviation losses relative to 
the efficient equilibrium (e.g., Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).  
10
 Some of these determinants do not apply to both classes of games under consideration. 
For example, since stag-hunt games are a special kind of order-statistic game (minimum), 
the coordination requirement issue is moot for them. 
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questions seem of obvious importance. Behavioral determinants are affected by 
individual risk attitudes. They are also affected by cognition (and therefore also affected 
by structural characteristics). They might also be affected by what players make of 
opportunities for shared experience, interaction, and informational feedback provided by 
the experimenter. Importantly, they add to the exogenous risk characteristics endogenous 
ones that VHBB (1990, 1991) called “strategic uncertainty”: One’s own behavior is a 
function of the objective characteristics of the environment but also of its subjective 
characteristics (e.g., one’s own beliefs about the cognition and risk attitudes of the other 
players, other players’ beliefs, cognition, and behavior, and higher-order beliefs).  
 
We now turn our attention to what we know empirically about the structural, cognitive, 
and behavioral determinants. 
 
3. LABORATORY EVIDENCE OF COORDINATION FAILURES AND SUCCESSES 
 
3.1. Attractiveness of the secure strategy and riskiness of the other action(s) 
 
Order statistic games. Was efficiency psychologically salient in VHBB (1990, 1991) or 
were competing concepts such as security, or risk dominance, more salient?  
 
The key result of VHBB (1990) is the stable and speedy unraveling of action choices to 
the worst of the seven Pareto-ranked strict equilibria. Between 14 – 16 participants 
played the stage game repeatedly (10 times in treatment A, and 5 times in treatment A’), 
receiving only information about their payoffs after each stage. The outcome was 
essentially the same even after payoff efficient precedents emerged in a treatment (B) that 
was inserted between treatments A and A’ for four out of six sessions. Several other 
experimenters – in baseline treatments for various modifications reported in those papers 
-- replicated this unraveling result with the same payoff matrix, and with subject numbers 
varying from 6 – 14 (e.g., Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Bornstein, Gneezy and Nagel, 
2002; Blume and Ortmann, 2005; Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher, 2005). Other 
experimenters – also in baseline treatments for various modifications reported in those 
papers -- chose structurally similar payoff matrices (e.g., linear deviation costs, no 
negative payoffs) with slightly more or less action choices (e.g., Berninghaus and 
Ehrhart, 1998; Knez and Camerer, 1994; Weber, Camerer, Rottenstreich and Knez, 2001; 
Brandts and Cooper, 2004, 2005, 2005a) and also replicated this result. 
 
The key result of VHBB (1991) is the influential role that the initial action choices 
played.  For the baseline treatment neither the unique payoff dominant equilibrium nor 
the unique secure equilibrium emerged when 9 participants played the stage game 
repeatedly (again 10 times) receiving only information about their payoffs after each 
stage. Furthermore, the initial median constituted a strong precedent from which subjects 
had trouble extracting themselves. Blume and Ortmann (2005), in their baseline 
treatments, replicated this result by using the same payoff matrix, the same number of 
subjects, and the same feedback conditions. So did Cachon and Camerer (1996). So did 
VHBB (1993). 
 7 
Because of their remarkable results on coordination failure, VHBB (1990, 1991) drew 
considerable attention and a steady flow of attempts to test their robustness.
11
   
 
Every choice between a secure and a (set of) riskier actions is ultimately a function of 
(the perception of) expected values of the available choices. The higher the expected 
value of the secure action (relative to the riskier action(s)) the more likely it is to 
undermine the risky actions, and vice versa. (Of course, the expected value is also a 
function of the order statistic, group size, etc.)   
 
Brandts and Cooper (2005a) address this issue head-on. Studying coordination in a 
minimum effort game with five effort levels, and keeping the payoff associated with the 
minimum constant, they vary the payoff associated with the efficient equilibrium (an idea 
already explored in Knez and Camerer, 1994), and observe higher incidence of 
coordination success as the efficient equilibrium becomes significantly more attractive.  
 
Other authors have explored the robustness of coordination by manipulating 
experimentally the type and strengths of the deviation costs. Keeping the action space 
roughly comparable to that in the classic VHBB (1990) study, Berninghaus and Ehrhart 
(1998) introduced longer time horizons (scaling down the per-round payoffs 
accordingly), so as to lower the opportunity cost of exploration. They showed that 
number of rounds had the hypothesized effect although they did not bring about complete 
convergence to the Pareto-efficient outcome, and although they did not make a difference 
in the distribution of initial choices, as one might expect.  
 
Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin (2001) explore the consequences of a finer action grid 
(as well as the impact of order statistic and number of players). Letting their subjects 
choose among 101 actions (and letting them run through twice the numbers of rounds), 
Van Huyck et al. (2001) find that local exploration is “skewed in the direction of 
efficiency” (p. 14). It is possible, and likely – in light of the observed perfect correlation 
between “creeping up” and time in some of the treatments and the results by Berninghaus 
and Ehrhart (1998) --, that this result is due to both the refined action space as well as the 
increased number of rounds.
12
 The refined action space, in conjunction with the 
somewhat larger number of rounds, may also have been responsible for a similar drift 
toward efficiency in Van Huyck, Cook and Battalio (1997). 
 
                                                 
11 VHBB (1990, 1991) themselves conducted a number of important robustness tests. 
Among their key insights are the importance of the number of participants, the matching 
protocol, the feedback conditions, and the deviation cost. In VHBB (1990), for example, 
the authors demonstrated (in the already mentioned treatment B) that setting the 
coefficient on the deviation cost equal to zero lead to quick convergence to efficiency. 
They also demonstrated that two participants when matched repeatedly and with the same 
person (but not with randomly drawn others), were able to coordinate on the efficient 
outcome. 
12
 We can not tell for sure because only order statistic and number of players were 
systematically varied.  
 8 
Anderson, Goeree and Holt (2001) and Goeree and Holt (2005) explicitly introduce a cost 
of exerting effort in both minimum effort and median effort games, to be deducted from 
the payoff represented by the value of the order statistic. In experiments for two-player 
minimum and both three-player minimum and median effort games with random 
matching, they document significantly higher frequency of coordination on the payoff-
dominant equilibrium for lower costs.  
 
Stag-hunt games. Both CDFR (1990) and CDFR (1992) were concerned with stag-hunt 
games of the sg(1,x,y,z) variety where x < y = z. CDFR (1990), however, embedded the 
stag-hunt games (in games 3 – 8 the 2 x 2 principal minor was the same across all games) 
into a larger 3 x 3 matrix that featured – apart from two Pareto-ranked equilibria of the 
embedded stag-hunt games (the “augmented stag-hunt game”) – a cooperative (Pareto-
dominant in games 3 – 6 but not games 7 - 8) outcome that was induced by a dominated 
strategy. The key question was whether the Pareto-dominant equilibrium would always 
be selected. The answer to this question was not in the affirmative. By and far, dominated 
strategies that could induce Pareto-dominant equilibria were not selected.  
 
Following up on related work published in CDFR (1989), CDFR (1992) also explored 
whether the results in CDFR (1990) were robust to the use of both one-way and two-way 
communication, for both the augmented stag-hunt game and the  particular 
parameterization of the stag-hunt game, 1,000g(1,0,.8,.8), discussed earlier. Coordination 
failure turned out to be endemic in the no-communication baseline conditions (and still 
significant with one-way communication); coordination failure was eliminated by two-
way communication between players. We return to the issue of communication below.  
 
It is important to mention that these coordination failure results came about under a 
matching protocol that differed sharply from the one used by VHBB (1990, 1991) and 
other multi-player studies afterwards. Specifically, while VHBB and others nearly always 
used multi-player, finitely repeated coordination games, CDFR (1989, 1990, 1992) used 
two-player, sequences of one-shot games resulting from a random matching or rotation 
matching (Kamecke, 1997) protocol. This choice of interaction pattern makes an 
efficiency reducing difference. (More on this in section 3.3.)  
 
In the following years, several authors followed up on the CDFR results. Overall, it is 
interesting to note, and very likely a consequence of the predominant matching protocol, 
that many authors working in this area focused on the structure of the payoff matrix (e.g., 
Battalio, Samuelson and Van Huyck [BSVH], 2001, and Clark, Kay and Sefton [CKS], 
2001)
13
 rather than implementation details that had shown to be of importance in order 
statistic games. 
                                                 
13
 BSVH (2001) used a random matching protocol (allowing for repeated interaction) to 
explore through between-subject design three variants of the stag hunt game that differed 
in the optimization premia, R, reflected in the ratio of the payoffs of the risk-dominant 
equilibrium (40:20:12 = 2R:R:.6R). As hypothesized, BSVH find the premium affects 
systematically the responsiveness of beliefs and behavior which converges quicker the 
larger is the optimization premium, and also the adjustment process and initial choices. 
 9 
 
Schmidt, Shupp, Walker and Ostrom (2003), in an article closely related to BSVH 
(2001),  systematically vary measures of payoff-dominance and risk-dominance (the 
definition of which used here is nonstandard) and find – both for random matching and 
fixed matching protocols -- that players react to changes in risk-dominance but not 
payoff-dominance. This result contradicts both the results in BSVH (2001) and CKS 
(2001). Importantly, and also in contradiction to the message the title of their paper 
suggests, subjects selected “the payoff dominant strategy more often than not.” (Schmidt 
et al. 2003, p. 298), with this statement applying to all treatments (the four games 
employed, the random repeated match and fixed repeated match protocols, and the one-
shot random matching protocol).  
 
Arguably the most intriguing article in this area is Rankin, Van Huyck and Battalio 
[RVHB] (2000). The authors use a scaled-up version of g(1,0,x,x) where x is, for each 
round, drawn randomly from the unit-interval and then, ever so slightly, perturbed.  
Taking the cue from Kreps’s argument (1990, pp. 169 - 174) that experience with 
precisely the same game in precisely the same situation is hardly a way to instill trust in 
the generalizability of laboratory results, RHVB had their subjects play a sequence of 75 
such games, in addition scrambling the action labels so that the payoff dominant 
equilibrium and the secure equilibrium would not show up in the same cell throughout 
the 75 rounds. The intriguing result of this experiment was the high percentage of 
efficient play both when x <.5 (making the secure strategy less attractive and making 
payoff dominant and risk dominant equilibrium coincide) and when x>.5 (making the 
secure strategy more attractive and positioning the payoff dominant and the risk dominant 
equilibrium at opposite ends of the main diagonal).
14
 RVHB point out that this set-up 
inhibits learning from experience and focuses subjects on the exploration of deductive 
principles. In addition, in about half of the rounds subjects faced a situation in which  
payoff-dominance and risk-dominance selected the same equilibrium. It probably also 
helped that subjects were told in the instructions that “you will remain grouped with the 
same seven other participants for the next 75 rounds.” This formulation is likely to have 
translated in most subjects’ minds into, “I’m going to see each of the seven other 
participants about 10+ times”, a trust-building insight of sorts.  Obviously, the results 
reported in RVHB (2000) are dramatically at odds with claims that coordination failure is 
common.  
                                                                                                                                                 
CKS (2001) use two versions of the stag-hunt game, g(1,0,.8., .8.) and g(1,0,.9.,.7), both 
scaled up by s = 1,000. The first one replicates the CDFR (1992) design and is also 
similar to treatment 2R in BSVH, the second is similar to treatments R and .6R in BSVH 
albeit for another reason (the Aumann conjecture). In the absence of pre-play 
communication, CKS find no difference in outcomes between these two versions of the 
stag-hunt game when they match subjects randomly for ten rounds. This result seems to 
contradict the result in BSVH (2001). 
14
 Specifically, for the first 10 periods 65% (85%) of choices corresponded to the efficient 
action when x>.5 (x<.5). For the last 10 periods, about 90% (almost 100%) of the choices 
corresponded to the efficient action when x>.5 (x<.5). Thus, payoff dominance clearly 
carried the day. 
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3.2. Coordination requirement: order statistic and group size 
 
The coordination requirement in order statistic games is related both to the particular 
order statistic used to calculate payoffs and to the group size. The intuition suggests that, 
all other things being held constant, in the minimum effort game it is riskier to pick the 
efficient action in large groups than in small groups.  
 
Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin (2001) directly tested the claim that order statistic and 
group size are substitutes by experimentally crossing two group sizes (5 and 7) and two 
order statistics (2 and 4) in a 2 x 2 design that also featured a dramatically increased 
action space (101 actions) and a relatively large number of periods. The authors carefully 
analyze initial, adaptive, and terminal behavior.  Among the many interesting results – 
contradicting the Berninghaus and Ehrhart (1998) results about the initial values – is the 
finding that “some of the behavior predicted to emerge in the session has already been 
incorporated into initial behavior” (p. 9). Specifically, the variation in order statistic and 
group size influenced behavior in the first round, with subjects reacting more strongly to 
differences in the order statistic than in group size (see Table 2, p. 8). 
 
3.3. Shared experience, interaction, and other informational issues 
 
A precedent results from shared experience (Lewis, 1969) and creates expectations on the 
part of the participants about what happens next. Precedents are created when players 
interact repeatedly with the same players, as in VHBB (1991), or the two-player fixed 
matching treatments of VHBB (1990). Shared experience can also be induced, ex ante, 
via precedents established in other contexts. The possibility of observing the actions of 
other players, or the possibility to inform other players of one’s intentions through costly 
or costless pre-play communication is among the other informational issues that affect the 
outcomes of coordination games.  
 
Order statistic games. VHBB label precedents from other games “weak precedents” to 
distinguish them from the “strong precedent” established in a previous round of the same 
game (e.g., VHBB, 1990, 1991; Knez and Camerer, 2000; Weber, 2005; Devetag, 2005; 
or Brandts and Cooper, 2005a). This terminology is not always descriptive. Weber 
(2005), building on Knez and Camerer (2000, experiment 2), has demonstrated that -- if 
trust is being built slowly and new participants are made aware of the group’s history – 
efficient precedents can spill over from n-person weak-link experiments to (n+1)-person 
weak-link experiments (but see also Knez and Camerer, 2000, experiment 1). 
 
The effect of information has been studied in a number of experiments. On balance, the  
evidence seems to suggest that providing subjects with post-play information about the 
distribution of choices is efficiency enhancing (e.g., Berninghaus and Ehrhart, 2001; 
Brandts and Cooper, 2005; but see Devetag, 2005 and the full information treatment in 
VHBB 1990). The number of participants in these experiments suggests that a smaller 
number of participants reinforces efficiency. 
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Other studies investigate the role of pre-play communication which can be costly or 
costless (“cheap talk”). Both VHBB (1993) and Cachon and Camerer (1996) used costly 
(but tacit) information – VHBB auctioning off the right to play and Cachon and Camerer 
asking subjects to pay a fixed price – to overcome coordination failure completely. Costly 
communication has also been used in the intergenerational minimum effort game 
experiments by Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher (2005). Their results suggest that the 
quality of advice given is positively related to the probability of coordination success.  
 
Turning from costly to costless messages, Blume and Ortmann (2005), using the key 
earnings tables from VHBB (1990, 1991) to facilitate comparison, test the effect of cheap 
talk both in the Minimum and Median game. They find that costless messages with 
minimal information content, when added to games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, can 
facilitate both quick convergence to, and participants’ initial coordination on, the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium. Cheap talk is thus a substitute for other efficiency- enhancing 
design and implementation characteristics such as a more generous order statistic, smaller 
group size, or step size, or a refined actions space. See also Burton and Sefton (2004) for 
similar results in a closely related class of games. 
 
In Blume and Ortmann (2005), costless minimal information content pre-play messages 
take the specific form of “I intend to play action … “.  Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher 
(2005) and Brandts and Cooper (2005a) present a radical departure from this template 
allowing far-ranging communication that they analyzed ex post for content. The evidence 
in these papers suggests that the content of the information matters.  
 
Stag-hunt games. While a number of papers have studied the effect of changes in the 
payoff matrix (e.g., Friedman, 1996; Straub, 1995; BSVH, 2001; CKS, 2001; Schmidt et 
al., 2003; RVHB, 2000), relatively few authors have studied the effect of the kind of 
design and implementation details that we have documented in our discussion of order 
statistic games.  As our discussion of RVHB (2000) indicates, this state of affairs seems 
deplorable because these issues may be more important than structural characteristics of 
the payoff matrix. Shared experience is surely one such issue.  
 
Yet another issue, already established in the seminal work of CDFR (1992), is the impact 
of pre-play communication that does not involve costly signals. (In fact, the impact of 
costly signals has not been studied in the context of stag-hunt games.) Aumann (1990) 
conjectured that costless communication, or cheap talk, would significantly depend on the 
structure of the payoff matrix. Specifically, in g(1,0,.9.,.7) messages expressing the intent 
to shoot for the payoff-dominant equilibrium would not be credible because it is in a 
player’s interest to entice the other player to do so. In contrast, in g(1, 0,.8., .8.) such an 
expression would not be self-serving. CKS (2001) provide evidence in support of this 
conjecture when comparing no communication and two-way communication. Charness 
(2000) also provides evidence in favor of the Aumann conjecture. 
 
Concentrating on a set-up not afflicted by such issues of credibility, Duffy and Feltovich 
(2002, 2005) study the impact of words and deeds and lies on behavior in prominent 
strategic situations, including the stag-hunt game. If cheap talk is credible (i.e., not 
 12 
undermined by the kind of parameterizations that motivated the Aumann conjecture), 
then words indeed speak louder than deeds. While subjects are quite honest to start with, 
the possibility of being caught lying improves the already high coordination even more. 
 
Relatedly, and in an interesting twist on Van Huyck, Gillette and Battalio (1992), 
Bangun, Chaudhuri, Prak and Zhou (2006) study the effects of external assignments. The 
former authors had found significant effects of external assignments, but they found them 
in three-action scenarios with Pareto-ranked equilibria that did not have the tension 
between payoff-dominant and risk-dominant outcomes. Bangun et al., (2006) took Game 
2 of Rydval and Ortmann (2005), g(8,1,5,5), and found – in contrast to the results of 
Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher (2005) – that recommendations by the experimenter to 
play the risky strategy induce the efficient equilibrium under both “common knowledge” 
and “almost common knowledge”.  
 
Among the few papers that have explored implementation issues in the stag-hunt 
scenarios, Clark and Sefton (2001) investigate the role of interaction structure. Their 
experiment involves the play of a stag-hunt game either as a sequence of one-shot games 
implying a random matching protocol, or as a repeated game with a fixed matching 
protocol (recall VHBB 1990 for a similar exercise). The latter may influence behavior in 
a variety of ways, the most obvious of which is the possibility to use precedent. However, 
an additional, more subtle way in which a fixed matching protocol may alter behavior is 
through the possibility of costly signaling that it offers players. This type of signaling is 
costly insofar as it implies the possibility of having zero payoff rounds initially.  In order 
to distinguish between the two phenomena, Clark and Sefton investigate first round 
behavior, in which only the impact of signaling should be observed. Their data show that, 
indeed, in the first round of play the frequencies of choice of the risky action were 0.3 in 
the random matching and 0.6 in the fixed matching protocol, a highly significant 
difference. Moreover, the fixed matching protocol reduced the instances of 
disequilibrium outcomes and increased the overall proportion of risky choices across 
rounds.  
 
3.4. Negative payoffs  
 
Order-statistic games. Although an affine transformation of payoffs does not change the 
structure of equilibria in a coordination game, there is some evidence (albeit by no means 
undisputed, see e.g., List, 2004; Plott and Zeiler, 2005) that framing outcomes as gains or 
losses is not neutral with respect to behavior. Drawing on VHBB (1991, 1993), Cachon 
and Camerer (1996) investigate loss avoidance as a selection principle: if people follow 
loss avoidance, they should avoid playing strategies that result in certain losses if 
strategies leading to potential gains are available. They find that loss avoidance functions 
as a selection principle in the median as well as the minimum effort game, inducing 
coordination on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Here, too, no studies exist (yet) that 
investigate the role of negative payoffs in a systematic way, though it would seem to be 
called for given the likelihood that the initial choices in the classic Median and Minimum 
game (e.g., VHBB, 1990, 1991; Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Blume and Ortmann, 2005) 
were at least partially affected by the differential presence of negative payoffs. A 
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reasonable conjecture would be that the prominent negative payoffs in the upper right, 
and lower left, corner of the Median game earnings table of VHBB (1991) did affect 
people’s choices, and were responsible for the clustering of initial choices slightly above 
the secure action.  
 
Stag-hunt games. Rydval and Ortmann (2005), and Feltovich, Iwasaki and Oda (2005) 
tested experimentally the Cachon-Camerer conjecture that loss avoidance might also 
work its magic in stag-hunt games. Both their results seem to suggest that loss avoidance 
may indeed be a (weak) selection principle in stag-hunt games, especially if losses are 




What we have learned since VHBB (1990, 1991) and CDFR (1990, 1992)
15
: 
- Lower attractiveness of the secure action relative to the risky action required for the 
efficient equilibrium is efficiency-enhancing (e.g., Brandts and Cooper, 2004).  
- Low (zero) deviation costs are efficiency enhancing (e.g., VHBB, 1990; BSVH, 2001).  
- Lower costs of experimentation such as increasing the number of rounds while keeping 
the overall earnings roughly the same, or refining the actions space, or some combination 
thereof, are efficiency-enhancing (e.g., Berninghaus and Ehrhart, 1998; Van Huyck et al., 
2001). 
- Lower costs of exerting effort is efficiency-enhancing (e.g., Goeree and Holt, 2005). 
- Less stringent coordination requirements (i.e., a smaller group size or a less stringent 
order statistic) are efficiency-enhancing (e.g., VHBB, 1990; Van Huyck et al., 2001). 
- Fixed matching protocols are efficiency enhancing (e.g., VHBB, 1990; Clark and 
Sefton, 2001; Schmidt et al., 2003).  
- Repeated encounters are efficiency enhancing even under random matching schemes if 
the experimental design and implementation focuses subjects on deductive principles 
(e.g., Rankin, Van Huyck, and Battalio, 2000; see also Schmidt et al., 2003). 
- Providing full informational feedback seems efficiency enhancing in “small” groups 
(e.g., Berninghaus and Ehrhart, 2001; Brandts and Cooper, 2005; but see Devetag, 2005). 
- The possibility of observation of action choices, especially if paired with previous 
expressions of intent, is efficiency-enhancing (Duffy and Feltovich, 2002, 2005).  
- Slowly growing groups that have managed to establish efficient precedents, is efficiency 
enhancing (Weber, 2005).  
- Costly pre-play communication is efficiency-enhancing (e.g. VHBB, 1993; Cachon and 
Camerer, 1996). 
- Costless pre-play communication is efficiency-enhancing (e.g., CDFR, 1992; Van 
Huyck, Gillette, and Battalio, 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2005; Duffy and Feltovich, 
2002, 2005; Bangun, Chaudhuri, Prak and Zhou, 2006). 
- Higher quality of information, and common knowledge of information, are efficiency- 
enhancing (Chaudhuri, Schotter and Sopher 2005; see also Bangun, Chaudhuri, Prak and 
Zhou, 2006.)  
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 All statements below are ceteris paribus. 
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-  Loss avoidance may be efficiency-enhancing if losses are certain for a chosen action 





We have qualitatively reviewed the evidence on coordination failure in the laboratory 
While two initial sets of experiments (VHBB, 1990, 1991; CDFR, 1990, 1992) seemed to 
suggest that coordination failure is common, the sum total of subsequent attempts to 
understand the robustness of these results suggests myriad ways to engineer coordination 
successes in the lab.  
Much of what we know about the incidence, and/or emergence, of coordination successes 
(and failures) in the lab seems related to what we have called structural determinants. We 
know surprisingly little about the impact of cognitive and behavioral determinants in 
order-statistic and stag-hunt games. Even elementary behavioral determinants such as the 
effects of risk attitudes have hardly been studied directly (see Heinemann et al., 2004a, 
for an important and intriguing exception) although their potential impact has been 
indirectly acknowledged by some researchers analyzing stag-hunt games (e.g., the 
laudable but problematic early attempts by CDFR 1990, 1992 to control for risk 
preferences through the Roth – Malouf procedure in the stag hunt game) and 
demonstrated by a recent study by Holt and Laury (2002; see also Harrison et al., 2005; 
Holt & Laury, 2005). Surprisingly, the impact of group composition along dimensions 
such as cultural homogeneity remains also a blind spot (see Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 
2005, for an isolated exception).  
Moreover, cognitive determinants (e.g., how subjects interpret and represent - or maybe 
(mis)represent – the payoff matrix) need investigation.
16
 So do the impact of precedent 
formation and transfer and the effects of both the quantity and quality of information.  
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 The classic studies of VHBB (1990, 1991) used 7 action choices. Most later studies 
followed that pattern, at least approximately (e.g., Weber et al., 2001). An important 
exception is Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin (2001) who give subjects 101 action 
choices (and hence a 101x101 earnings table) in an attempt to reduce the costs of 
experimentation. It seems a reasonable conjecture that a 2 x 2 earnings table (as used in a 
typical stag-hunt games discussed below) or a 4 x 4 matrix with simple integer entries (as 
in Weber et al., 2001) is easier to understand than a 7 x 7 or 101 x 101 matrix. There is 
tantalizing evidence (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Devetag and Warglien, 2005; Wilcox, 1993) that 
the complexity of the matrix, and for that matter the task itself, systematically affects 
people choice of strategies and heuristics. For example, we conjecture that the difference 
in results between Bangun et al. (2006) and Chaudhuri et al. (2005) is likely to reflect the  
complexities of the tasks involved. Realizing the problem, Van Huyck, Battalio, and 
Rankin (2001) address the issue by comparing percentages of initial choices in their 
earlier experiments but this comparison is confounded by the use of a new technology. 
Somewhat surprisingly, there exist up to now no studies that use easily available 
strategies such as MouseLab that have been used successfully in other contexts (e.g., 
Johnson et al., 2002) to study information acquisition and choice patterns.  
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Clearly, the question of how wide spread and pervasive coordination failure is can hardly 
be answered conclusively by summarizing the extant experimental literature the way we 
have done. Ideally, one would start with an identification of a widely agreed-upon set of 
key determinants that could span an agreed-upon parameter space. Preferably, the 
parameter ranges could be calibrated with data from the real world (something which is a 
standard practice in macro economics but a practice essentially non-existent in micro-
economics).
17
   
 
Notwithstanding frequent appeals to real-world problems (e.g., Knez and Camerer, 1994, 
Camerer and Knez, 1996; Knez and Simester, 2001; Weber et al., 2001; Weber, 2005; 
Brandts and Cooper, 2004, 2005, 2005a; Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher, 2005; for a 
laudable exception see Cooper, 2006), the coordination literature has not been much 
concerned with external validity, and surely not with issues of calibration, for that matter. 
Of course, not every experiment has to be calibrated. Much can be learned from 
experiments such as Rankin, Van Huyck and Battalio (2000) because they ask 
fundamental questions about what it is that we test in the laboratory.  
 
That said, the evidence that we have accumulated strongly suggests that efficiency- 
enhancing strategies (e.g., cheap and not so cheap talk, observation, etc.) are those that 
get us closer to the world that we claim to explain. The evidence that we have compiled 
above suggest myriad ways to engineer efficient outcomes in the lab. To the extent that 
most of these ways seem to enhance external validity (e.g., various forms of 
communication, repetition of slightly payoff perturbed games, etc.) we conclude that 
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